分包和不完全競爭性招標

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分包和不完全競爭性招標(中文3800字,英文2500字)
文   摘
本文研究了成本契約的不完全性及其意義除在橋梁施工分包決定產業。建設合同是不完整的,因為在施工期間原始設計圖和規格可能需要修改。根據交易成本理論-科斯(1937),威廉姆森(1985)|合同的修改會導致顯著的談判,暨南成本 。此外,理論預測這些成本如果分包商執行更大的工作。向前看的承包商預期這些成本并將他們投標。我創造了一個實證框架量化在成本上的影響都不整合,非綜合交易并把它應用到32橋招惹加洲合同離開-品德的交通工具。合同中包含許多工作條款(如鑄造混凝土,鉆井、交通分拆涂料)。每個項目,承包商決定是否執行操作自己或租一分包商并提交一份報價。不同之間的工作在原合同項目數量,數量安裝后——其實殘缺的代表。在估計,我解釋戰略方面招標投標,并恢復成本結構,利用面板數據帳戶分包商為擁的決定。平均來說,不完全性解釋一小部分費用,2%,為綜合交易和很大一部分,13%,非綜合交易。研究結果提供定量的證據支持在-完整的承包和理論具有一定的實際得到評估采購工作.

外文原文:
Subcontracting and Competitive Bidding on Incomplete Procurement Contracts
This paper investigates the cost implications of contractual incompleteness and itse ect on subcontracting decisions in the bridge construction industry. Construction contracts are incomplete because the original blueprints and specications may require modications during construction. According to the transactions cost theory of the rm|Coase (1937), Williamson (1985)|such contract revisions can lead to signicant bargaining and renegotiation costs. Furthermore, theory predicts these costs are larger if a subcontractor performs the work. Forward looking contractors anticipate these costs and incorporate them in their bids. I develop an empirical framework to quantify the impact of incompleteness on cost for both integrated and non-integrated transactions and apply it to 32 bridge contracts procured by the California Depart-ment of Transportation. Contracts contain many work items (e.g. casting concrete,drilling, trac striping). For each item, contractors decide whether to perform work themselves or hire a subcontractor and submit a bid. The di erence between the work item quantity in the original contract and the quantity actually installed after revi-sions proxies for incompleteness. In estimation, I account for the strategic aspects of bidding to recover cost from bids and exploit the panel data structure to account for the endogeneity of subcontracting decisions. On average, incompleteness explains a small portion of cost, 2%, for integrated transactions and a large portion, 13%, for non-integrated transactions. The results provide quantitative evidence in support of in-complete contracting theories of the rm and have practical signicance for evaluating procurement practices.

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